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ABSTRACT 
Business exit has implications for a firm’s corporate strategy. Two types of exit events are 
distinguished: those that involve strategic change and those that are status quo-preserving. 
This study investigates the impact of CEO turnover and succession on strategic versus status 
quo-preserving business exits. Based on a sample of CEO turnover and succession events and 
subsequent business exits of German corporations from different industries, our results 
suggest that neither voluntary nor involuntary CEO turnover is relevant to business exit. In 
contrast, outsider succession significantly affects the likelihood of strategic business exit, 
while a corporation’s performance does not moderate this relationship.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Business exit results in a reduction in size of a divesting parent firm and has implications for 
corporate strategy. Typically, it aims at contracting firm boundaries, whereas acquisitions,  
alliances, or internal developments are used for expansion (Bowman & Singh, 1993; Hurry, 
1993; Schendel, 1993; Singh, 1993; Villalonga & McGahan, 2005). A business exit is not 
necessarily associated with a firm’s failure to pursue a superior strategy. On the contrary, 
business exits may be a sign of a firm’s strategic viability. Consider, for example, 
Burgelman’s (1994, 1996) findings on Intel’s exit from the dynamic random access memory 
(DRAM) business in the mid-1980s and this firm’s simultaneous transformation into a 
microcomputer company. Burgelman’s seminal studies and more recent evidence by Brauer 
(2009) suggest that business exit bears the potential for strategic change and thus may 
contribute to a firm’s organizational viability in the long run.  
The vast majority of studies on business exit focus on antecedent performance problems 
(Brauer, 2006; Johnson, 1996; Singh, 1993). Fewer studies have examined the role of top 
executives in promoting exit decisions and simultaneously nurturing strategic change (e.g., 
Brauer, 2009; Fondas & Wiersema, 1997; Wiersema, 1992). Incumbent executives can be 
trapped in the pursuit of a certain strategic path due to their strong commitment to a 
previously chosen strategic direction (Hannan & Freeman, 1989; Staw & Ross, 1987; Zajac 
& Bazerman, 1991). They may be reluctant to divest an entity and change their firm’s 
strategic direction (e.g., Gordon, Smith, Sweo, & Luker, 2000; Porter, 1976; Shimizu & Hitt, 
2005; Wiersema, 1992, 1995). In such a situation, the turnover of the incumbent CEO can be 
an appropriate mechanism to motivate business exit (Hayward & Shimizu, 2006), and 
especially an exit that involves strategic change (Brauer, 2009). These effects can be 
expected because new CEOs tend to be more open to strategic reorientation, must prove to 
the firm’s stakeholders that their strategic approach is distinct from their predecessors, and 
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because they can more easily convince employees to support a new course of action, 
especially if they come as outsiders to the firm (Datta, Rajagopalan, & Zhang, 2003; Isabella, 
1990). Although divestiture research can be traced back to seminal studies from the 1970s 
and the 1980s (e.g., Gilmour 1973; Boddewyn, 1979; Porter 1976; Duhaime & Grant 1984; 
Montgomery & Thomas, 1988; Nees, 1981), it neither pays much attention to different types 
of business exit nor to the nature of CEO turnover and succession as antecedents of different 
exit types. Therefore, in this paper, we ask: How do CEO turnover and succession events 
affect the likelihood of business exit both in general and in terms of business exit types?  
With this study, we contribute to business exit research in two ways. First, we extend 
research on the motives for and outcomes of business exit by introducing different exit types. 
Specifically, we differentiate between two types: The abandonment of a business unit that 
involves strategic reorientation is denoted as a strategic business exit, while the divestiture of 
a business unit that does not change a parent firm’s strategic trajectory is considered a status 
quo-preserving business exit. Second, we extend previous research by investigating the 
impact of firms’ executive succession events on the likelihood of a particular business exit 
type. Our research is based on a sample of 122 CEO turnover and succession events in 98 
divesting and non-divesting German corporations from different industries during the period 
of 1998-2004. 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. First, we review prior studies on 
business exit and the literature on executive turnover and succession. Thereby, we consider 
both routine versus non-routine turnover and insider versus outsider succession. Drawing on 
the upper echelons perspective (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Hambrick, 2007), we develop a 
conceptual framework that predicts the impact of CEO turnover and succession on business 
exit (e.g., Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 2004). Our framework aims at identifying the 
direct effect of CEO turnover and CEO succession on the likelihood of business exit. Since 
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firm performance is generally viewed as the most important predictor of business exit (e.g., 
Cho & Cohen, 1997; Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1991; Robbins & Pearce, 1992), our framework 
also considers the moderating effect of performance. Second, based on the hypotheses that 
we specify within this framework, we elaborate on our research methods, including sample 
selection, data sources, measures, and analytical procedures. Third, we present our empirical 
results. We calculate logistic regression models that, on the one hand, illustrate the likelihood 
of business exit in general and, on the other hand, show the effects of the pre-specified 
antecedents on the likelihood of strategic versus status quo-preserving business exit. Finally, 
we discuss the contributions and limitations of our findings and trace promising avenues for 
future research.  
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
Business Exit 
Prior studies on business exit primarily focus on the question of whether and why a business 
unit needs to be divested. The specified antecedents most often refer to financial 
performance, corporate diversification, executive turnover and institutional pressures (Brauer, 
2006; Johnson, 1996). Poor performance is a particularly strong predictor of business exit. 
Both underperformance at the firm and at the business unit level are important antecedents 
(Chang, 1996; Duhaime & Grant, 1984; Montgomery & Thomas, 1988; Singh, 1993). An exit 
will be especially likely, if a declining business unit’s poor performance persists and the 
whole corporation’s performance suffers accordingly (e.g., Brauer, 2009; Cho and Cohen, 
1997; Montgomery and Thomas, 1988). In addition, businesses are likely to be divested when 
the competences that are unified in a single corporation have become too dissimilar (e.g., 
Byerly, Lamont, & Keasler, 2003; John & Ofek, 1995; Johnson, 1996; Markides, 1992a, 
1992b; Steiner, 1997). The arrival of a new CEO also increases the likelihood of divestiture 
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(e.g., Matthyssens & Pauwels, 2000; Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1991; Shimizu and Hitt, 2005). 
Moreover, firms often must prove their investment legitimacy to powerful institutional 
investors, e.g., banks, insurance companies or financial holdings (e.g., Ward, Brown, & 
Graffin, 2009). Institutional investors aim at controlling corporate managers so as to 
circumvent strategies that may have a negative impact on firm performance, for example, 
because they contradict a firm’s dominant logic (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). Thus, investors 
are at least partly responsible for business exit decisions (Bethel and Liebeskind, 1993; 
Zuckerman, 2000).  
Many studies focus on business exits with positive financial results (e.g., Chang, 1996; John 
& Ofek, 1995; Mulherin & Boone, 2000; Steiner, 1997). A smaller number of studies show 
that a business exit also can be a vehicle for the elimination of a misconceived strategy that 
puts a firm’s existence at risk (e.g., Burgelman, 1994, 1996; Kaiser & Stouraitis, 2001; 
Markides, 1995). Byerly et al. (2003) differentiate between refocusing and repositioning with 
regard to business exit. Refocusing means that, by divesting a business unit, a firm eliminates 
non-core activities, and the firm’s strategic focus is narrowed (Zuckerman, 2000). Consider, 
e.g., Sears Roebuck that refocused its retailing business by withdrawing from the financial 
services and insurance industries. By repositioning a firm eliminates its former core business 
and simultaneously establishes a new one (Byerly et al., 2003). Eckes, the German producer 
of spirits and juices is a case in point. As a result of a steadily decreasing per capita 
consumption of spirits in Germany and strong legislative pressures, Eckes sold its traditional 
domestic hard liquor business and transformed itself into a company producing high-quality 
juices (Brück, 2006). Business exit can thus be an opportunity for strategic change 
(Hoskisson & Johnson, 1992).  
Exits involving refocusing or repositioning are risky and comprehensive strategic choices. 
Thus, not surprisingly, many if not most business exits do not involve a major change. An 
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exit that is not associated with strategic change but merely results in a reduction of firm size 
can be viewed as defensive (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009; Morrow, Johnson, & 
Busenitz, 2004). In this study, a strategic business exit is a divestiture of a business unit 
involving strategic change in terms of refocusing or repositioning. Divestitures that do not 
imply a change in a corporation’s strategic direction are termed status quo-preserving 
business exits. 1  
The Chief Executive Officer’s (CEO) Functions 
Top executives are responsible for major strategic decisions and corporate performance 
(Gordon et al., 2000; Parrino, 1997; Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1996; Wiersema, 1992, 1995). 
Their responsibilities encompass substantive decisions that affect a firm’s competitive 
positioning and its resource allocation, and they include symbolic activities that convey 
meaning beyond the substance inherent in their decisions (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Guthrie & 
Datta, 1997; Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). Although the CEO is embedded in a team of top 
managers, due to his/her leading position s/he is especially powerful, in particular with regard 
to decisions that pertain to strategic change or acquisition and divestiture processes (Hayward 
& Shimizu, 2006). Due to the dependence of firms on their leading persons’ actions the 
question “Why do organizations act as they do?” (Hambrick & Mason, 1984: 193) implies 
the question “Why do top managers act as they do?” The upper echelons perspective assumes 
that managers’ career paths, professional positions and personal backgrounds determine their 
cognitive perspectives which influence their strategic choices (Bigley & Wiersema, 2002; 
Zajac & Westphal, 1996).2 While the turnover of a CEO can be expected to contribute to the 
                                                 
1 We are aware that refocusing may imply a less radical strategic shift than repositioning. However, since 
refocusing is a major step towards de-diversification that helps clarify a firm’s strategic direction 
(Zuckerman, 2000), it is considered a strategic business exit.  
2 This view of the CEO’s role has not remained uncriticized. However, prior evidence corroborates that CEOs 
exert a particularly strong influence on a firm’s fate and that environmental and competitive conditions alone 
do not determine a firm’s strategic direction (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Fondas & Wiersema, 1997; Hambrick, 
2007; Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987; Kesner & Sebora, 1994). 
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likelihood of strategic change, changes in the rest of the top management team (without the 
CEO) can even discourage change. The latter can be expected because newly appointed 
executives have not yet had the time to establish group dynamics, trust, and communication 
structures in their organizations that facilitate shifts in corporate strategy (Gordon et al., 
2000; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992; Wiersema, 1995). As Kesner and Sebora (1994: 328) put it, 
“the CEO is the agent who is ultimately responsible and accountable for action on and 
reaction to an organization’s strategy, design, performance and environment.” Thus, 
consistent with Hambrick’s (2007) suggestion to concentrate on those executives who 
substantially matter in a decision domain under study, we focus on the CEO’s impact on the 
likelihood and type of business exit.  
CEO Turnover 
Due to the CEO’s primary role and the far-reaching nature of the event, turnover has been 
attracting numerous management researchers’ attention for many years (Kesner & Sebora, 
1994; Shen & Cho, 2005). CEO turnover can occur in different ways (Comte & Mihal, 1990; 
Denis & Denis, 1995; Grusky, 1960): A manager can retire or step down from his position to 
pursue other career options, or s/he may be dismissed. Thus, routine (voluntary) and non-
routine (involuntary) turnover is commonly distinguished. Regardless, “Turnover, whether 
voluntary or involuntary, represents a major event for the firm and can determine its 
subsequent performance and direction” (Furtado & Karan, 1990: 60).  
All turnover events can be viewed as a step towards a better fit between the leading person 
and the firm’s requirements. CEO turnover can help eliminate a misalignment between a top 
executive’s actions and firm needs with regard to remaining profitable or otherwise 
successful (Furtado & Karan, 1990). It frequently coincides with corporate restructuring 
activities such as business exit (e.g., Matthyssens & Pauwels, 2000; Ravenscraft & Scherer, 
1991) because “the need for corporate restructuring to better align the firm with its 
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environment may not be apparent to the current top management team” (Wiersema, 1995: 
199). Particularly, CEO tenure can act as an effective barrier to business exit, because a 
longer tenure fosters a higher reluctance to change (Bigley & Wiersema 2002). Therefore, 
CEO turnover can help overcome dysfunctional inertia that results from incumbent 
executives’ commitment to the current strategy. Furthermore, if corporate decisions can be 
determined by the choice of executives (Wiersema, 1992: 74), the question of whether a 
turnover occurs voluntarily or involuntarily may predict the likelihood of business exit. In 
general, we assume that non-routine CEO turnover is more likely to be positively associated 
with the occurrence of business exit than routine turnover, because such an event is more 
incisive and better suited to overcome dysfunctional commitment to a current course of 
strategic action. What follows is: 
Hypothesis 1:  If a firm experiences a non-routine turnover event, the likelihood of business 
exit will increase. 
The type of CEO turnover may also determine the type of business exit chosen. Non-routine 
executive turnover events promote the simultaneous pursuit of business exit and strategic 
change. Firms that dismiss their CEOs have been shown to experience significant declines in 
their dependence on their former core business, whereas firms with greater top management 
team stability face less strategic change (Wiersema, 1995). In addition, new CEOs must 
prove their distinctiveness from their predecessors to shareholders, customers and employees. 
Their backgrounds, skills, and experiences may differ from their dismissed predecessors and 
might enable a new understanding of a firm’s problems and thus facilitate major strategic 
shifts (Kraatz & Moore, 2002) such as strategic business exits. Conversely, routine CEO 
turnover is more likely to be associated with the new leader’s pursuit of continuity and 
stability and hence the adoption and maintenance of the predecessor’s strategic course of 
action. A routine turnover following, for example, the incumbent CEO’s retirement, is likely 
to be a smooth and often carefully orchestrated transition. The heir-apparent successor is 
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known to the departing CEO, the firm’s other top managers, and the board of directors. There 
will be no need to initiate strategic change, as long as the parent firm does not face severe 
financial distress (Friedman & Singh, 1989). In addition, incumbent CEOs frequently tend to 
believe that their successors need to be similar to them to guarantee continuity of the chosen 
strategic direction. In case of voluntary turnover, they can exert a certain influence on the 
choice of the new CEO and determine the successor’s extent of similarity (Hambrick, 
Geletkanycz, & Fredrickson, 1993; Nielsen, 2009; Zajac & Westphal, 1996). With this strong 
emphasis on continuing the current strategic direction business exits, to the extent that they 
do occur, are likely to be status quo-preserving. Thus: 
Hypothesis 2a:  If a business exit is preceded by a non-routine CEO turnover event, the 
likelihood of strategic business exit will increase. 
Hypothesis 2b:  If a business exit is preceded by a routine CEO turnover event, the 
likelihood of status quo-preserving business exit will increase. 
CEO Succession 
Conceptually, succession can be separated from turnover. Although succession cannot occur 
without turnover, routine and non-routine turnover do not necessarily involve a particular 
succession type. Both routine and non-routine turnover can lead to either insider or outsider 
succession. Hence, they are not interdependent and can be investigated as related but 
different phenomena. Executive succession has been motivating management scholars’ 
research efforts for more than four decades (e.g., Friedman & Singh, 1989; Grusky, 1960, 
1961, 1963; Helmich & Brown, 1972; Virany, Tushman, & Romanelli, 1992; Zajac & 
Westphal, 1996). CEO succession challenges a firm’s internal stability and has implications 
for organizational effectiveness, since the whole organization needs to get used to the new 
leading person (Datta & Guthrie, 1994; Grusky, 1960). The question of why some 
successions promote strategic change while others do not has mainly been answered based on 
the origin of a new CEO, i.e., his/her insider or outsider status. Insiders are top managers who 
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are promoted from within the firm, while outsiders are executives who come from other 
organizations from the same or another industry (Fondas & Wiersema, 1997; Friedman & 
Singh, 1989; Guthrie & Datta, 1997; Pitcher, Chreim, & Kisfalvi, 2000; Shen & Cannella, 
2002; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2003; Zajac & Westphal, 1996). The intrafirm labor market for 
the choice of a new CEO bears considerable advantages. For instance, the recruitment of an 
insider enhances loyalty and morale among the workforce, because an insider is better able to 
attract and retain employees than an outsider, and s/he signals continuity and stability to all 
stakeholders. Moreover, the new CEO is already known in the organization. Management and 
staff know his/her leadership style, skills and qualifications. At the same time, the new top 
executive is familiar with the firm’s structure, practices, corporate culture, and product 
offerings, and s/he is a part of internal networks and communities. These set of conditions 
make it likely that an executive is selected who is similar to the rest of the top management 
team in terms of personality, attitudes and endeavors (Datta & Guthrie, 1994; Nielsen, 2009; 
Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2003). However, if the firm needs new perspectives or new 
knowledge, an insider will not be the appropriate candidate, because his/her selection fosters 
continuity and the tendency to continue with the chosen course of action (Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984). Therefore, to encourage change, many companies decide to hire an outsider, 
e.g., an executive from another firm in the same industry in order to learn from the actions of 
peer industry firms. Other firms even choose a manager from a different industry to benefit 
from completely new ideas and perspectives or close an apparent knowledge gap (Guthrie & 
Datta, 1997; Nielsen, 2009; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2003). As the likelihood of business exit 
will increase if a firm hires a CEO from outside the organization, what follows is:  
Hypothesis 3: If the newly appointed CEO is an outsider, the likelihood of business exit 
will increase.  
The experience that is gained during a long tenure promotes an internal successor’s greater 
commitment to a prevailing strategic direction and rather defensive strategic choices 
  10
(Finkelstein et al., 2009). Strategic change is most likely, if the incumbent CEO is replaced 
by a manager who comes from the outside. Outsiders are less inclined to adhere to the status 
quo but are more likely to act as change agents (Kraatz & Moore, 2002; Wiersema, 1992). 
Change is likely to be promoted by managers who come from completely different 
institutions or from those organizations that are experienced with practices that are lacking in 
the organization in question. The higher the new CEO’s dissimilarity from his predecessor, 
the greater are the changes that s/he is likely to introduce (Finkelstein et al., 2009). If 
managers come from outside the firm, they are not trapped in a prevailing cognitive 
framework and thus more keen to experiment with new ways to deal with the challenges they 
face (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Pressures to maintain the status quo are mitigated because 
“newly appointed managers were not the architects of the prior strategy and so they have a 
lower level of psychological investment in the strategy” (Lant, Milliken, & Batra, 1992: 591). 
The recruitment of an outsider is also a powerful signal to external stakeholders that a firm 
seriously pursues a new strategic direction (Datta & Guthrie, 1994; Friedman & Singh, 1989). 
Thus, the appointment of an outsider CEO will not only foster the likelihood of business exit 
in general but also that of strategic business exit (Gilmour, 1973; Hayward & Shimizu, 2006; 
Nielsen, 2009). Conversely, an insider signals stability and continuity to the firm’s 
stakeholders (Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2003). Due to the fact that the new CEO has been 
affiliated with the parent firm for many years, s/he will be less inclined to promote strategic 
business exits and prefer a strategic option that promises stability of a firm’s strategic 
direction such as status quo-preserving business exits. Strategic change that implies 
innovation and a new way of thinking is less likely under these conditions (Finkelstein et al., 
2009; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). Therefore, we suggest: 
Hypothesis 4a: If the newly appointed CEO is an outsider, the likelihood of strategic 
business exit will increase. 
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Hypothesis 4b: If the newly appointed CEO is an insider, the likelihood of status quo-
preserving business exit will increase. 
The Moderating Effect of Firm Performance 
The turnover-exit relationship is likely to be different for firms that are solvent and those that 
suffer from financial distress. Prior to non-routine turnover, firms often experience a 
significant decline in performance (Bresser & Valle Thiele, 2008; Westphal & Fredrickson, 
2005; Zajac & Westphal, 1996). The forced resignation of a CEO and his replacement is 
focused on rapid and sustained performance improvements during the periods following the 
turnover and succession events. Measures undertaken by a new CEO to improve performance 
can be expected to be more rigorous for firms with forced CEO resignations than for those 
with routine management turnovers (Denis & Denis, 1995). Hence, we suggest that after a 
non-routine turnover and in the presence of declining performance, the general likelihood of 
business exit may increase.  
In financially distressed firms forced turnover events are frequently initiated by board 
members or bank lenders. For instance, during the process of private debt restructuring in 
order to avoid bankruptcy it is common to replace a CEO (Farrell & Whidbee, 2003; Gilson, 
1989, 1990; Gilson & Vetsuypens, 1993). Nowadays increasingly strong performance 
pressures are exerted on CEOs (Kaplan, 2008). These pressures have become much higher 
since the end of the 1990s compared to studies that have examined CEO turnover in prior 
time periods (e.g., Comte & Mihal, 1990; Huson, Parrino, & Starks, 2001). Extended periods 
of low performance often prompt investors to exert influence on a lowly performing firm’s 
board to dismiss the CEO. The board may react with the replacement of the CEO to placate 
the investment community and, typically, it looks for an executive who holds promise to alter 
the firm’s strategic direction (Farrell & Whidbee, 2003; Ward et al., 2009). Thus, under 
conditions of declining firm performance, a non-routine CEO turnover is likely to be 
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associated with both the likelihood of business exit in general and that of strategic business 
exit in particular: 
Hypothesis 5a: Non-routine turnover increases the likelihood of business exit under 
conditions of declining firm performance.  
Hypothesis 5b: Non-routine turnover increases the likelihood of strategic business exit 
under conditions of declining firm performance. 
If declining firm performance is not attributed to a firm’s management by the investment 
community, for example, during periods of general economic downturns, forced turnover is 
less likely. In these situations, turnover events are likely to be of a routine type, and the 
measures taken by the new CEO are not likely to deviate from the firm’s overall strategic 
direction. It follows that:  
Hypothesis 5c: Routine turnover increases the likelihood of status quo-preserving business 
exit under conditions of declining firm performance. 
In the presence of dissatisfactory firm performance the likelihood of the recruitment of an 
outsider is also increased, since new perspectives on and attitudes toward a firm’s current 
situation are likely to be preferred to firm-specific skills and experiences (Datta & Guthrie, 
1994; Schuler & Jackson, 1987; Schwartz & Menon, 1985). Internal succession is more likely 
in the presence of superior performance (Guthrie & Datta, 1997), because satisfactory 
performance nurtures the selection of a new CEO who does not differ significantly from the 
predecessor (Finkelstein et al., 2009). Since boards are more likely to appoint an outsider in 
financially difficult situations, we expect that under conditions of dissatisfactory 
performance, outsider succession is positively related to the likelihood of business exit in 
general, since managers who have been hired from outside the firm are better able to deviate 
from the organization’s prior growth trajectories.  
According to Boeker (1997), weak financial performance and CEO succession complement 
and reinforce each other. In the presence of a sustained performance decline, CEO succession 
is more likely to be associated with strategic change than under conditions of satisfactory 
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financial performance. Thus, a newly appointed CEO who comes from the outside after a 
firm has experienced a pronounced performance decline is a strong signal for the necessity of 
a new beginning (Cho & Cohen, 1997; Farrell & Whidbee, 2003) and enhances the likelihood 
of strategic business exits. Conversely, if the new CEO is an insider, a status quo-preserving 
business exit will be preferred even in the presence of a performance decline, because the 
insider is a member of the group of persons who have formulated and implemented the 
current strategy (Lant et al., 1992). As Schuler and Jackson (1987: 207) put it, “insiders are 
slow to recognize the onset of decline and tend to persevere in strategies that are no longer 
effective”. Therefore, and consistent with the assertion that executive job demands act as a 
moderator of upper echelons predictions (Hambrick, 2007: 335), we suggest that the 
relationship between business exit type and succession type is moderated by a divesting 
firm’s performance. Weak performance is a challenging job demand to a CEO (Hambrick, 
Finkelstein, & Mooney, 2005) and in combination with outsider succession it fosters the 
likelihood of strategic business exit, while the simultaneous occurrence of financial problems 
and insider succession promote the likelihood of status quo-preserving business exit. What 
follows are: 
Hypothesis 6a: Outsider succession increases the likelihood of business exit under 
conditions of declining firm performance.  
Hypothesis 6b: Outsider succession increases the likelihood of strategic business exit under 
conditions of declining firm performance. 
Hypothesis 6c: Insider succession increases the likelihood of status quo-preserving business 
exit under conditions of declining firm performance. 
Figure 1 summarizes the hypotheses outlined above. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
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METHODS 
Sample and Data Sources 
The sample for the study consists of CEO turnover and succession events in publicly traded, 
divesting and non-divesting firms that took place during 1998 and 2004. All firms had to be 
listed in the German HDAX so that comparable data on performance and strategy could be 
obtained from public sources (Datta et al., 2003). The HDAX comprises the shares of all 110 
companies that are listed in the selection indices DAX, MDAX and TecDAX that are 
included in the so called Prime Standard.3 As compared to the DAX, the HDAX represents a 
broader index that covers all sectors and the shares of the largest companies from the Prime 
Standard (Deutsche Börse Group, 2009). In order to test our hypotheses we used secondary 
data from several databases. The LexisNexis database helped identify those firms among the 
companies that were listed in the HDAX that reported one or even more CEO turnovers in the 
selected time period. In doing so, we aimed at comparing divesting with non-divesting firms. 
The Mergers & Acquisitions Database provided information on the likelihood of business 
exit in these firms during that period. Bloomberg, Compustat Global, Datastream, 
Worldscope, and the Hoppenstedt Database and manuals provided the additionally required 
data, such as financial ratios, ownership stakes, or date of company foundation. The final 
sample consists of 122 CEO turnover and succession events in 98 divesting and non-
divesting firms from different industries, e.g., telecommunications, food products, 
construction, chemicals, or financial services. The number of business exits for that sample is 
187. As was the case in prior studies (e.g., Schipper & Smith, 1986), the number of firms is 
lower than the number of turnovers and business exits because of multiple turnovers and exits 
by the same parent firms in the observed time period.  
                                                 
3 The Prime Standard is a EU-regulated segment for companies that aim at positioning themselves vis-à-vis 
international investors. In addition to the requirements of the General Standard, which represent the statutory 
minimum requirements of the Regulated Market, companies in the Prime Standard are obliged to adhere to 
high international transparency standards and regulations. 
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Variables and Measures 
Dependent variables. The first dependent variable is exit, i.e., a dummy indicating whether or 
not a firm has undertaken at least one business exit within a given year. The second 
dependent variable denotes the exit type, with 0 = “no exit”, 1 = “status quo-preserving 
business exit” and 2 = “strategic business exit”. Thereby, the numbers and types of segments 
in different NACE codes reported by a focal firm are analyzed over the time period in order 
to measure reductions or changes in corporate diversification which indicate refocusing 
and/or repositioning (Villalonga & McGahan, 2005) Based upon the NACE classification, 
which is the German equivalent to the SIC in the U.S., the absolute difference in the 
diversification level between the years t (= year of business exit) and t+1 (= one year after 
exit) is calculated and represents the kind of change in corporate strategy. Refocusing means 
a reduction in the number of NACE codes that a firm reports, while repositioning is revealed 
by a change in a firm’s main classification code. If a business exit does not involve strategic 
reorientation, there will be no visible change in a firm’s NACE.  
Independent variables. The independent variables in this study focus on the change and 
replacement of the CEO. The variable turnover measures whether a turnover is voluntary or 
involuntary (with 0 = “routine”, 1 = “non-routine”). In order to codify the 122 CEO turnover 
events in this study, we used a rigorous procedure (Bresser & Valle Thiele, 2008) and content 
analyzed newspaper articles and corporate press releases. For each turnover event, we 
analyzed all available articles from LexisNexis that we identified according to the search 
words predecessor (name), successor (name) and company (name). Two researchers 
independently codified the items and classified them as either routine or non-routine. A 
turnover was considered as a routine turnover, when the incumbent CEO left the firm in order 
to seize other career opportunities, for personal or age reasons, or when the CEO had died. It 
was codified as non-routine, when there were clear indications of disagreements between the 
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departing CEO and the board. We achieved a high inter-coder reliability of 93.6 % which is 
also reflected by a satisfactory Kappa coefficient of 0.859 (p < 0.001) (Bresser & Valle 
Thiele, 2008).  
The variable succession, measures whether a new CEO has come from outside into the firm 
and has not been member of the top management team before (with 0 = “internal succession” 
and 1 = “external succession”) (Shimizu & Hitt, 2005). Tenure is a further indicator of a 
newly appointed CEO’s status as either an insider or an outsider (Chaganti & Sambharya, 
1987). Therefore, it is considered in this study as an alternative indicator for the type of CEO 
succession. It is the difference between the date of a manager’s assignment to the CEO 
position and the date of his/her entry into a firm (Datta & Guthrie, 1994). The categorization 
of succession types and the managers’ tenures could be derived unambiguously from 
corporate press releases and articles published in the daily business press and collected in 
LexisNexis.  
Since performance decline at the firm level is a strong predictor of business exit (Cho & 
Cohen, 1997), three performance variables are included in the models: the accounting-based 
measure of operational performance EBIT, the customer-focused and growth-oriented 
indicator sales growth (SG), and the market-based measure return to shareholders (RTS), all 
measured one year prior to a business exit (Brealey, Myers, and Allen, 2008; Bresser & Valle 
Thiele, 2008; Farrell & Whidbee, 2003). Due to data constraints, we cannot include 
performance measures at the business unit level. Therefore, we concentrate on overall 
performance indicators that attract the investors’ attention due to their high visibility and 
importance for investment decisions.  
Control variables. Since a firm’s debt may cause divestitures (Bergh, 1998; Gilson, 1989, 
1990, Kaiser & Stouraitis, 2001), we incorporate debt-to-market value (DM) one year prior to 
an exit as a control variable. We control for a firm’s strategic direction with focus, i.e., the 
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number of businesses with distinct NACE codes at the five-digit level that a firm is engaged 
in. The higher this number, the more dissipated is a firm’s strategic focus (John & Ofek, 
1995; Steiner, 1997). In addition, firms need to prove to be a worthy investment to their 
owners (e.g., Zuckerman, 2000). A group of owners who is dominant due to its relative size 
and power is able to strongly determine a firm’s strategic direction (Gillan & Starks, 2003; 
Pedersen & Thomsen, 2003; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). Even if we observe that new 
outsider CEOs are likely to pursue strategic business exit, this decision may not be due to 
their openness to change but to their endeavor to meet relevant and powerful stakeholders’ 
expectations (Hambrick, 2007: 338). Especially public firms like those listed in the HDAX 
are increasingly dependent on institutional investors, such as banks, insurances, and financial 
holdings that provide access to capital (Bethel & Liebeskind, 1993; Ward et al., 2009; 
Zuckerman, 2000). Hence, the dummy variable institutionally dominated (owner), indicating 
whether or not financial investors are the main stockholders of a divesting firm, is included. 
We control for firm age (logarithm of the number of years in the year of exit) and firm size 
which is measured as the logarithm of the number of employees (Morrow, Sirmon, Hitt, & 
Holcomb, 2007). Prior studies show that firm age predicts a CEO’s insider or outsider status 
and indicates his experience and propensity to take risks or initiate change, and firm size and 
succession type seem to be interdependent (e.g., Dalton & Kesner, 1983; Datta & Guthrie, 
1994; Guthrie & Datta, 1997; Schwartz & Menon, 1985). We also test the influence of 
industry on business exit with a dummy variable with 1 = “manufacturing” and 0 = “services 
industries” (Mellewigt, Madhok, & Weibel, 2007), since the environment exerts a certain 
influence on organizational governance structures and hence CEO turnover and succession 
events (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Nielsen, 2009).  
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Analytic Procedures 
As Table 1 shows, we find significant correlations among some variables. Therefore, 
variance inflation factors (VIF) and tolerance measures are calculated. A tolerance measure 
of 0.20 or less is still acceptable, whereas a value of 0.10 or even less is an indicator of 
multicollinearity. A VIF should not exceed 5 (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999). In this study 
the highest VIF is 1.362 for firm size and the lowest tolerance measure is 0.734 for the same 
variable, indicating that there is no problem of multicollinearity among the variables.  
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
Referring to our hypotheses, we first examine the impact of CEO turnover and succession 
and other antecedents on the likelihood of business exit in general (H1, H3). The dependent 
variable in these models and in those for testing H5a and H6a is the likelihood of business 
exit in general. Binomial logistic regressions are used, as they are beneficial in examining 
binary choices (Bergh, Johnson, & Dewitt, 2008; Wooldridge, 2006). Second, we calculate 
multinomial logistic regressions for the hypotheses 2a-b, 4a-b, 5b-c, and 6b-c. We use a 
limited range variable with the three pre-specified exit options, whereby “no exit” is our 
reference group (omitted variable) against which we compare status quo-preserving and 
strategic business exit (Eisenmann, 2002). Third, in addition to the analysis of main effects, 
we enter multiplicative terms between the dummy variables turnover type and succession 
type and the three performance indicators into the regressions (Wooldridge, 2006). As we 
estimate nonlinear models, the effect of an interaction is a function of the coefficients for 
each interacted variable and the values of all the variables requiring the inspection of 
marginal effects (Hoetker, 2007). Therefore, “one must compute the cross derivative of the 
expected value of the dependent variable. To test for the statistical significance of the 
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interaction effect must be based on the estimated cross-partial derivative, not on the 
coefficient of the interaction term” (Norton, Wang, & Ai, 2004: 156).4 Although our 
regressions including interactions with dummy variables for succession are sufficient to test 
Hypothesis 6, we additionally use interactions with tenure. Specifically, we calculate a series 
of three interaction terms by multiplying tenure with each of the three performance indicators 
(Zajac, Kraatz, & Bresser, 2000) and test their effects on the likelihood of business exit and 
different exit types.  
 
RESULTS 
Table 2 reports the results of the logistic regression analyses for the effects of turnover type, 
succession type, and tenure on the likelihood of business exit. Hypothesis 1 suggests that 
non-routine turnover enhances the likelihood of business exit. However, our results do not 
support this hypothesis. Hypothesis 3 asserts that outsider succession promotes business exit. 
Our results do not corroborate this idea. Neither the coefficient for succession type nor tenure 
reveals significant effects.  
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
Referring to the distinction between different business exit types, Model 2 in Table 3 shows 
that, in contrast to the hypotheses 2a and 2b, neither routine nor non-routine CEO turnover 
nurtures the likelihood of a special business exit type. However, in line with Hypothesis 4a, 
outsider succession enhances the likelihood of strategic business exit, as Model 3 in Table 3 
                                                 
4 We use Stata 9 for the estimation of our models. For the binary logistic regressions we use the logit and inteff 
commands, for the multinomial logistic regressions we apply the mlogit and mfx commands.  
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shows (p<.05). If we measure succession type in terms of tenure, the results in Model 4 
illustrate that longer tenure fosters the likelihood of status quo-preserving business exit.  
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------- 
Our hypotheses 5a-c and 6a-c suggest that business exit and particular exit types that follow 
CEO turnover and succession events are especially likely under certain circumstances that 
pertain to a divesting parent firm’s performance. However, the results that are reported in 
Table 4 do not support the hypotheses 5a and 6a. Under conditions of declining firm 
performance, neither non-routine turnover nor outsider succession nor tenure increases the 
likelihood of business exit. The estimation of the marginal effects with regard to the 
interaction effects in these models and the respective graphs illustrate that the interaction 
effects are not significant. Marginal effects represent how a one-unit change in an 
explanatory variable affects the probability of pursuing a business exit.5 Furthermore, none of 
the models that are reported in Table 4 is significant. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------ 
According to Hypothesis 5b, the interplay between non-routine turnover and decreasing 
performance enhances the likelihood of strategic business exit, while Hypothesis 5c predicts 
that the interaction between routine turnover and declining performance promotes the 
likelihood of status quo-preserving business exit. Referring to the hypotheses 5b and 5c, the 
results presented in Table 5 do not provide any support. An inspection of the marginal effect 
                                                 
5 Due to space constraints, we do not report the marginal effects. Effect sizes and graphs are available upon 
request from the authors.  
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shows that the interactions are, in fact, not significant. With regard to the hypotheses 6b and 
6c, the results also refute our hypotheses. Model 5 in Table 5 suggests that outsider 
succession in combination with an increasing return to shareholders exerts a significant 
influence on the likelihood of status quo-preserving business exit. The significant marginal 
effect for this interaction corroborates the relationship. We have calculated additional 
regressions with tenure as an indicator for a CEO’s status as either an insider or an outsider. 
However, interacting tenure with our performance indicators also does not provide support 
for our hypothesis 6b, as an inspection of Models 7 through 9 reveals.  
Overall, the results illustrate that the impact of a firm’s upper echelons on business exit is 
weaker than expected. Other factors seem to exert a stronger influence. In most models 
concerning the likelihood of business exit types, a dissipated strategic focus positively affects 
the likelihood of strategic business exit. Firm size exerts a weak but positive influence on the 
likelihood of status quo-preserving business exit, suggesting that inertial forces can 
successfully prevent that divestitures are used to change a firm’s strategic direction.  
 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Following the basic premise of the upper echelons perspective, this study argues that firms’ 
strategic actions are influenced by the main characteristics of their leading actors (Hambrick, 
2007; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). More precisely, it focuses on the idea that different types 
of CEO turnover and succession affect the way firms divest business units and thus shape 
their strategic directions. In addition, it examines how performance challenges moderate the 
relationship between routine versus non-routine CEO turnover and insider versus outsider 
succession and the likelihood of business exit in general and different business exit types 
(Hambrick et al., 2005). Contrary to our expectations, non-routine turnover and outsider 
succession do not increase the likelihood of business exit in general in our sample. One 
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important (non-) finding of our study is that turnover type does not seem to affect business 
exit. Non-routine turnover does not promote strategic business exit, and routine turnover does 
not enhance the likelihood of status quo-preserving business exit, even in the presence of 
declining performance. Referring to succession types, we gain partial support for our 
hypotheses. Outsider succession actually fosters the likelihood of strategic business exit in 
our sample, while an insider CEO in terms of a longer tenure nurtures status quo-preserving 
business exit. These results suggest that future studies should continue to explore the effects 
of succession events on business exit. In contrast, the pursuit of research relating turnover 
events to business exit seems to hold little promise.  
The interaction between succession type and performance even shows that the interplay 
between outsider status and return to shareholders nurtures status quo-preserving business 
exits, suggesting that under conditions of satisfactory market performance the necessity to 
change a divesting firm’s strategic direction may decrease. Other antecedents seem to exert a 
stronger influence on business exit than the firms’ leading actors. Especially, a divesting 
firm’s size and degree of diversification affect the likelihood of certain business exit types. 
For example, firm size tends to nurture status quo-preserving business exit. Interestingly, 
institutional ownership does not exert a significant influence on business exit. Prior empirical 
evidence reveals that different types of owners and especially owners that are important 
suppliers of financial resources have important implications for corporate strategy and firm 
performance (e.g., Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). However, in the German context, other 
owner types may exert a stronger influence on a firm’s strategic choices than institutional 
owners, for example, family ownership. Future studies on business exit should take national 
differences and ownership structures into account and also consider contingency factors such 
as firm size and diversification strategy.  
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This study has several limitations that provide opportunities for future research. First, by 
assessing the influence of CEOs, we mainly focus on turnover and succession types as well as 
tenure. It could well be that other demographic characteristics resulting from prior experience 
or socio-political factors can also help explain strategic choices (e.g., Zajac & Westphal, 
1996). The consideration of additional characteristics may also permit more sophisticated 
methods that investigate the impact of certain factors at different levels of analysis (e.g., 
Nielsen, 2009). Second, although this study aims at explaining strategic change as triggered 
by different types of divestitures, it relies on cross-sectional data and analyses. As opposed to 
the chosen approach, panel data are beneficial in explaining changes in organizational 
structure and strategy over a selected time period and showing how different contingency 
factors affect the likelihood of certain strategic choices over time (e.g., Zajac et al., 2000). 
Third, although it is well understood that a CEO exerts the main influence on substantive 
strategic decisions such as business exit (Hayward & Shimizu, 2006, Lambert, Larcker, & 
Weigelt, 1991) while changes in the rest of the top management team do not seem to be as 
important as CEO turnover and succession (Gordon et al., 2000), future studies should take 
this issue into account, since there might be differences for samples from different 
institutional contexts.  
Despite these limitations, our study contributes to management research in several ways: 
First, in contrast to prior studies that differentiate between exit modes in terms of, e.g., sell-
off or spin-off (e.g., Bergh et al., 2008), we distinguish between business exit types according 
to their strategic consequences. Thereby, we summarize both aggressive and defensive 
strategic choices (Finkelstein et al., 2009) in terms of refocusing and repositioning (Byerly et 
al., 2003) under the notion of strategic business exit. We compare this type of divestiture with 
status quo-preserving business exit that implies a reduction of assets and activities without 
involving a change of the corporation’s strategic direction (Morrow, Sirmon, Hitt, & 
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Holcomb, 2007). Although business exit is mainly undertaken for the purpose of performance 
enhancement, strategic change as an implication of business exit has largely been ignored by 
prior research. Studies by Burgelman (1994, 1996) and Byerly et al. (2003) are rare 
exceptions. Accordingly, a perspective emphasizing the negative connotation of business 
exit, i.e., failure, predominates the literature, although it can also be viewed as a new 
beginning for a firm and a sign of strategic vitality. Second, in this study the role of the upper 
echelons in promoting business exit and business exit types takes center stage. Thereby, we 
do not only test whether the occurrence of a change of the CEO enhances the likelihood of 
business exit (types). We additionally differentiate between turnover and succession that are 
interdependent but different events, by distinguishing between routine (voluntary) and non-
routine (involuntary) turnover as well as insider and outsider succession. To our knowledge, 
this is the first study in the field of strategic management that relates different types of 
turnover and succession to different types of business exit. Prior studies have also examined 
the role of top executives in divestitures (e.g., Brauer, 2009; Kaiser & Stouraitis, 2001; 
Shimizu & Hitt, 2005; Wiersema, 1992, 1995), but they have not further differentiated 
between turnover and succession types. Our results show that outsider succession nurtures 
strategic business exit, while a longer tenure tends to promote status quo-preserving business 
exit. Finally, as firm performance has proved to be the most important predictor of business 
exit (e.g., Brauer, 2006; Cho & Cohen, 1997), we study the effects of performance variables. 
On the one hand, we use these indicators as additional factors in order to test to what extent 
performance affects the likelihood of business exit and business exit types; on the other hand, 
we use these performance measures as moderating variables that are expected to strengthen 
the impact of different turnover and succession events on business exit. We show that 
outsider succession in combination with increasing return to shareholders enhances the 
likelihood of status quo-preserving business exit, while outsider succession in isolation 
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promotes strategic business exit. These findings suggest that an increase in a performance 
indicator that is important to investors can decrease the propensity to alter a firm’s strategic 
direction, irrespective of the new CEO’s status as an outsider. The propensity to take risks 
associated with strategic change seems to decrease. The CEO’s responsiveness to relevant 
stakeholders’ expectations may outweigh the effect of succession type that can be observed 
without the interaction with performance. Future studies may investigate more thoroughly the 
extent to which a new CEO has discretion to act independently from the interests represented 
by specific performance indicators.  
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FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
FIGURE 1.  
HYPOTHESES 
 
(a) Turnover Effects: 
 
 
(b) Succession Effects: 
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TABLE 1.  
MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS AND CORRELATIONS 
 
Variables Means SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 exit 0.328 0.471 1.000             
2 turnover  0.325 0.470 0.050 1.000            
3 succession  0.344 0.477 0.229* 0.100 1.000           
4 tenure 8.973 10.978 0.139 -0.166 -0.177 1.000          
5 EBIT 762055.033 2967951.329 0.012 0.041 -0.186* 0.052 1.000         
6 RTS 0.004 0.341 -0.085 -0.129 -0.139 0.090 0.072 1.000        
7 SG 12.325 24.357 0.056 0.089 -0.124 -0.044 -0.083 0.104 1.000 0.035      
8 DM 2.584 4.829 0.235** 0.096 0.140 -0.066 0.036 -0.178* 0.035 1.000      
9 focus 3.311 2.330 0.096 0.094 0.111 0.039 -0.090 -0.215* -0.241* -0.181 1.000     
10 owner 0.263 0.442 0.083 -0.024 0.101 -0.027 -0.024 0.074 -0.103 -0.009 0.050 1.000    
11 firm size 4.020 0.725 0.203* -0.153 0.062 0.057 0.159 -0.184 -0.177 -0.033 0.236* -0.054 1.000   
12 firm age 1.734 0.512 0.079 -0.021 -0.044 0.053 0.149 0.011 -0.234* 0.030 -0.074 0.186* 0.099 1.000  
13 industry dummy 0.462 0.501 0.161 -0.065 0.002 -0.069 0.113 0.024 0.141 0.230* -0.048 0.168 -0.151 -0.059 1.000 
N = 122. Significance levels: ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.  
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TABLE 2.  
THE EFFECTS OF TURNOVER TYPE AND SUCCESSION TYPE ON THE 
LIKELIHOOD OF BUSINESS EXIT IN GENERAL 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables beta (s.e.) beta (s.e.) beta (s.e.) beta (s.e.) 
constant -4.271** (1.986) -4.596** (2.099) -4.228** (2.011) -4.033** (2.030) 
firm size 0.334 (0.366) 0.393 (0.386) 0.301 (0.370) 0.276 (0.377) 
firm age 0.667 (0.620) 0.682 (0.618) 0.552 (0.633) 0.465 (0.614) 
industry 0.288 (0.569) 0.402 (0.583) 0.235 (0.577) 0.504 (0.592) 
EBIT 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
RTS -0.015 (0.754) 0.083 (0.755) 0.216 (0.772) -0.015 (0.797) 
SG 0.010 (0.014) 0.009 (0.014) 0.011 (0.014) 0.011 (0.014) 
DM 0.119 (0.083) 0.109 (0.085) 0.126 (0.084) 0.109 (0.083) 
focus 0.157 (0.114) 0.137 (0.116) 0.155 (0.116) 0.147 (0.118) 
owner -0.149 (0.602) -0.189 (0.604) -0.227 (0.618) -0.196 (0.632) 
turnover   0.395 (0.593)     
succession      0.858 (0.583)   
tenure       0.037 (0.025) 
Nagelkerke R square 0.120 0.128 0.157 0.150 
-2 Log Likelihood 87.185 85.992 85.009 80.420 
Chi square 6.643 6.990 8.819 7.878 
df 9 10 10 10 
N = 122. Significance levels: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.  
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TABLE 3.  
THE EFFECTS OF TURNOVER TYPE AND SUCCESSION TYPE ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF STRATEGIC OR STATUS QUO-
PRESERVING BUSINESS EXIT 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 status quo strategic status quo strategic status quo strategic status quo strategic 
Variables beta (s.e.) beta (s.e.) beta (s.e.) beta (s.e.) beta (s.e.) beta (s.e.) beta (s.e.) beta (s.e.) 
constant -7.259*** (2.707) -3.188 (3.778) -7.347*** (2.821) -4.176 (3.815) -7.413*** (2.754) -2.571 (4.010) -6.775** (2.748) -2.310 (3.732) 
firm size 1.021* (0.541) -0.867 (0.789) 1.023* (0.560) -0.893 (0.867) 1.018* (0.549) -1.450 (1.026) 0.863 (0.546) -1.027 (0.824) 
firm age 0.780 (0.737) 0.920 (1.008) 0.812 (0.740) 0.919 (1.023) 0.755 (0.753) 0.418 (1.119) 0.544 (0.744) 0.917 (1.017) 
industry -0.429 (0.705) 1.593 (1.283) -0.352 (0.713) 1.900 (1.368) -0.507 (0.725) 2.272 (1.545) -0.222 (0.735) 1.351 (1.280) 
EBIT 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
RTS -1.415 (1.225) 1.358 (1.172) -1.416 (1.248) 2.062 (1.480) -1.302 (1.252) 2.499* (1.503) -1.232 (1.260) 1.999 (1.480) 
SG 0.023 (0.016) 0.002 (0.027) 0.024 (0.017) -0.001 (0.025) 0.025 (0.017) 0.011 (0.029) 0.025 (0.017) 0.002 (0.026) 
DM 0.130 (0.100) -0.207 (0.230) 0.127 (0.103) -0.240 (0.245) 0.132 (0.100) -0.327 (0.288) 0.144 (0.100) -0.244 (0.242) 
focus 0.000 (0.145) 0.469** (0.215) -0.003 (0.147) 0.48* (0.247) -0.007 (0.147) 0.635** (0.298) -0.021 (0.152) 0.497** (0.237) 
owner -0.057 (0.730) 0.471 (1.043) -0.090 (0.733) 0.729 (1.049) -0.084 (0.741) 0.523 (1.142) -0.067 (0.770) 0.734 (1.161) 
turnover     0.078 (0.724) 1.607 (1.159)         
succession          0.656 (0.677) 2.594** (1.300)     
tenure             0.058* (0.030) -0.040 (0.059) 
Nagelkerke R square 0.350 0.374 0.413 0.391 
-2 Log Likelihood 100.437 97.865 94.950 92.365 
Chi square 24.734 26.461 30.222* 26.485 
df 18 20 20 20 
N = 122. Significance levels: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.  
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TABLE 4.  
THE MODERATING EFFECT OF PERFORMANCE ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF BUSINESS EXIT IN GENERAL 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Variables beta (s.e). beta (s.e.) beta (s.e.) beta (s.e.) beta (s.e.) beta (s.e.) beta (s.e.) beta (s.e.) beta (s.e.) 
constant -1.038*** (0.343) -0.946*** (0.446) -0.925** (0.357) -1.286*** (0.390) -1.247*** (0.381) -1.324*** (0.413) -1.448*** (0.415) -1.308*** (0.397) -1.547*** (0.424) 
firm size -0.104 (0.041) -0.099** (0.041) -0.097** (0.045) -0.101** (0.040) -0.098** (0.039) -0.106*** (0.040) -0.121*** (0.045) -0.118*** (0.043) -0.128*** (0.045) 
firm age -0.340** (0.170) -0.362** (0.153) -0.341** (0.157) -0.349** (0.163) -0.381 (0.165) -0.349** (0.176) -0.387*** (0.143) -0.380*** (0.141) -0.362*** (0.139) 
industry 0.626*** (0.223) 0.593*** (0.210) 0.535** (0.208) 0.612*** (0.221) 0.642*** (0.216) 0.590*** (0.224) 0.666*** (0.215) 0.640*** (0.211) 0.612*** (0.204) 
DM       0.142** (0.061) 0.164** (0.068) 0.156*** (0.065) 0.167** (0.066) 0.159** (0.063) 0.162** (0.065) 
focus 0.181*** (0.057) 0.183*** (0.054) 0.190*** (0.056) 0.178*** (0.054) 0.185*** (0.058) 0.183*** (0.057) 0.202*** (0.062) 0.194*** (0.055) 0.194*** (0.062) 
owner 0.023 (0.135) 0.09 (0.108) 0.050 (0.109) 0.092 (0.126) 0.078 (0.121) 0.088 (0.125) 0.082 (0.105) 0.082 (0.098) 0.085 (0.099) 
EBIT 0.000 (0.000)     0.000 (0.000)     0.000 (0.000)     
RTS   -0.472 (0.936)     -0.224 (0.962)     0.533 (1.442)   
SG     -0.006 (0.014)     0.006 (0.008)     0.013 (0.009) 
turnover 0.321 (0.505) 0.161 (0.463) -0.246 (0.513)             
nonroutine X EBIT 0.000 (0.000)                 
nonroutine X RTS   1.2445 (1.243)               
nonroutine X SG     0.024 (0.019)             
succession        0.852* (0.487) 0.841* (0.444)         
outsider X EBIT       0.000 (0.000)           
outsider X RTS         -0.224 (0.962)         
outsider X SG           0.008 (0.017)       
tenure             0.060** (0.028) 0.045* (0.025) 0.057** (0.027) 
tenure X EBIT             0.000 (0.000)     
tenure X RTS               0.533 (1.442)   
tenure X SG                 -0.001 (0.001) 
Pseudo R square 0.220 0.218 0.224 0.243 0.243 0.243 0.254 0.252 0.259 
Log Pseudolikelihood -59042 -59.165 -58.695 -58.41 -58.47 -58.41 -54.008 -54.161 -53.647 
Wald Chi square 29.99 29.43 31.68 33.70 30.76 33.70 30.31 31.61 31.03 
Prob > Chi square 0.0004 0.0005 0.0002 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0004 0.0002 0.0003 
df 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
N = 122. Significance levels: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.  
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TABLE 5.  
THE MODERATING EFFECT OF PERFORMANCE ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TURNOVER TYPE AND 
SUCCESSION TYPE ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF BUSINESS EXIT TYPE 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  status quo strategic status quo strategic status quo strategic 
Variables beta (s.e.) dy/dx beta (s.e.) dy/dx beta (s.e.) dy/dx beta (s.e.) dy/dx beta (s.e.) dy/dx beta (s.e.) dy/dx 
constant -1.304*** (0.391)  -6.355*** (1.973)  -1.158*** (0.375)  -8.006*** (3.044)  -1.174*** (0.402)  -6.175*** (1.932)  
firm size -0.114** (0.046) -0.019** -0.011 (0.064) 0.000 -0.108** (0.047) -0.019** -0.022 (0.069) 0.000 -0.110** (0.050) -0.019** 0.019 (0.059) 0.000 
firm age -0.301 (0.046) -0.052 0.759 (0.951) 0.005 -0.345** (0.173) -0.060** 1.259 (1.330) 0.002 -0.313* (0.174) -0.056* 0.861 (0.856) 0.006 
industry 0.593** (0.258) 0.097** 2.375** (1.002) 0.014 0.544** (0.229) 0.093** 2.793** (1.100) 0.005 0.468** (0.222) 0.078** 2.489** (0.986) 0.015 
DM 0.201*** (0.062) 0.034*** -0.076 (0.298) -0.001 0.161** (0.069) 0.028** -0.200 (0.313) -0.001 0.175** (0.070) 0.031** -0.093 (0.326) -0.001 
focus 0.147*** (0.056) 0.024*** 0.399*** (0.120) 0.002 0.151*** (0.051) 0.026*** 0.531*** (0.154) 0.001 0.160*** (0.055) 0.027*** 0.358*** (0.101) 0.002 
owner -0.056 (0.151) -0.010 0.263 (0.272) 0.002 0.067 (0.116)  0.218 (0.224) 0.000 0.019 (0.113)  0.178 (0.228) 0.001 
EBIT 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 0.000 (0.000) 0.000             
RTS       -1.011 (0.975) -0.176 1.836 (1.582) 0.004       
SG             -0.002 (0.013) 0.000 -0.025 (0.043) 0.000 
turnover 0.280 (0.560) 0.048 0.530 (0.812) 0.003 0.031 (0.529) 0.005 0.781 (0.814) 0.002 -0.491 (0.590) -0.082 0.003 (0.006) 0.003 
nonroutine X EBIT 0.000** (0.000) 0.000 0.000 (0.000) 0.000             
nonroutine X RTS       1.653 (1.401) 0.288 -0.296 (1.892) -0.001       
nonroutine X SG             0.015 (0.019) 0.004 0.030 (0.044) 0.000 
succession                    
outsider X EBIT                   
outsider X RTS                   
outsider X SG                   
tenure                   
tenure X EBIT                   
tenure X RTS                   
tenure X SG                   
Pseudo R square 0.249 0.256 0.246 
Log Pseudolikelihood -72.701 -72.006 -72.979 
Wald Chi square 55.43 94.17 56.20 
Prob > Chi square 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
df 18 18 18 
N = 122. Significance levels: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Omitted category: no exit. dy/dx are the marginal effects.  
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TABLE 5 (continued) 
  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
  status quo strategic status quo strategic status quo strategic 
Variables beta (s.e.) dy/dx beta (s.e.) dy/dx beta (s.e.) dy/dx beta (s.e.) dy/dx beta (s.e.) dy/dx beta (s.e.) dy/dx 
constant -1.540*** (0.427)  -6.561*** (2.020)  -1.603*** (0.434)  -8.157** (3.501)  -1.684*** (0.471)  -6.436*** (2.010)  
firm size -0.110** (0.044) -0.019** -0.016 (0.060) 0.000 -0.099** (0.043) -0.000** -0.039 (0.054) 0.000 -0.114** (0.045) -0.020** -0.005 (0.056) 0.000 
firm age -0.326* (0.174) -0.058** 0.776 (1.074) 0.004 -0.405** (0.185) 0.003** 1.458 (1.632) 0.003 -0.329* (0.198) -0.058* 0.965 (0.901) 0.006 
industry 0.572** (0.238) 0.097** 2.626*** (0.948) 0.011 0.625** (0.251) 0.102*** 2.286** (1.017) 0.004 0.557** (0.251) 0.093** 2.399** (0.996) 0.013 
DM 0.156** (0.062) **0.027 -0.114 (0.346) -0.001 0.197** (0.080) 0.032** -0.269 (0.355) -0.001 0.170** (0.067) 0.030** -0.066 (0.286) -0.001 
focus 0.143*** (0.054) ***0.024 0.460*** (0.114) 0.002 0.151*** (0.052) 0.245*** 0.527*** (0.136) 0.001 0.148** (0.057) 0.025*** 0386*** (0.115) 0.002 
owner 0.068 (0.129) 0.012 0.215 (0.230) 0.001 0.041 (0.126) 0.007 0.124 (0.224) 0.000 0.058 (0.125) 0.010 0.212 (0.232) 0.001 
EBIT 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 0.000 (0.000) 0.000             
RTS       -1.848 (1.140) -0.304 2.645* (1.518) 0.005       
SG             0.011 (0.008) 0.002 -0.025 (0.046) 0.000 
turnover                   
nonroutine X EBIT                   
nonroutine X RTS                   
nonroutine X SG                   
succession  0.840* (0.502) 0.156 0.291 (1.099) 0.000 0.962** (0.479) 0.170** 0.758 (0.920) 0.001 0.834 (0.540) 0.154 0.209 (1.010) 0.000 
outsider X EBIT 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 0.000 (0.000) 0.000             
outsider X RTS       3.778** (1.837) 0.621** -3.365 (3.292) -0.007       
outsider X SG             0.003 (0.017) 0.001 0.037 (0.053) 0.000 
tenure                   
tenure X EBIT                   
tenure X RTS                   
tenure X SG                   
Pseudo R square 0.259 0.304 0.260 
Log Pseudolikelihood -73.025 -68.535 -72.891 
Wald Chi square 60.59 57.98 59.20 
Prob > Chi square 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
df 18 18 18 
N = 122. Significance levels: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Omitted category: no exit. dy/dx are the marginal effects.  
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TABLE 5 (continued) 
  Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
  status quo strategic status quo strategic status quo strategic 
Variables beta (s.e.) dy/dx beta (s.e.) dy/dx beta (s.e.) dy/dx beta (s.e.) dy/dx beta (s.e.) dy/dx beta (s.e.) dy/dx 
constant -1.866*** (0.491)  -7.608*** (1.753)  -1.714*** (0.475)  -8.295*** (3.183)  -2.107*** (0.538)  -6.280*** (2.092)  
firm size -0.142*** (0.050) -0.025*** -0.006 (0.065) 0.000 -0.127*** (0.047) -0.022*** -0.022 (0.066) 0.000 -0.153*** (0.053) -0.026*** -0.004 (0.059) 0.000 
firm age -0.345** (0.142) -0.061** 1.037 (0.813) 0.003 -0.392** (0.161) -0.070** 1.731 (1.500) 0.002 -0.341** (0.141) -0.061*** 0.903 (0.925) 0.007 
industry 0.579*** (0.203) 0.100*** 2.837** (1.141) 0.008 0.601*** (0.216) 0.105*** 2.443** (1.015) 0.003 0.530*** (0.193) 0.088** 2.377** (1.020) 0.017 
DM 0.188*** (0.067) 0.033*** -0.16 (0.345) -0.001 0.185* (0.077) 0.033** -0.288 (0.229) 0.000 0.186** (0.072) 0.032** -0.060 (0.272) -0.001 
focus 0.169*** (0.059) 0.029*** 0.504*** (0.126) 0.001 0.169*** (0.051) 0.030*** 0.550*** (0.153) 0.001 0.171*** (0.061) 0.029*** 0.373*** (0.125) 0.002 
owner 0.032 (0.105) 0.005 0.258 (0.435) 0.001 0.056 (0.098) 0.010 0.140 (0.322) 0.000 0.051 (0.098) 0.009 0.188 (0.243) 0.001 
EBIT 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 0.000** (0.000) 0.000             
RTS       0.782 (1.525) 0.138 -0.401 (2.354) -0.001       
SG             0.018* (0.010) 0.003* -0.001 (0.023) 0.000 
turnover                   
nonroutine X EBIT                   
nonroutine X RTS                   
nonroutine X SG                   
succession                    
outsider X EBIT                   
outsider X RTS                   
outsider X SG                   
tenure 0.069** (0.032) 0.012** 0.063 (0.048) 0.000 0.054* (0.029) 0.010* -0.023 (0.052) 0.000 0.073** (0.031) 0.013** 0.018 (0.045) 0.000 
tenure X EBIT 0.000 (0.000) 0.000** 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000             
tenure X RTS       -0.103 (0.122) -0.018 0.237 (0.186) 0.000       
tenure X SG             -0.001 (0.001) 0.000 -0.001 (0.002) 0.000 
Pseudo R square 0.293 0.316 0.283 
Log Pseudolikelihood -66.044 -63.884 -67.013 
Wald Chi square 65.75 50.76 48.40 
Prob > Chi square 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 
df 18 18 18 
N = 122. Significance levels: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Omitted category: no exit. dy/dx are the marginal effects.  
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